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GUCCI AMERICA, INC. V. FRONTLINE
PROCESSING CORP.
721 F. SUPP. 2D 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Gucci America, Inc., v. Frontline Processing Corp., Gucci
America, Inc. ("Gucci") filed a trademark infringement suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
against three businesses, Durango Merchant Services ("Durango"),
Frontline Processing Corporation ("Frontline"), and Woodforest
National Bank ("Woodforest") (collectively "Defendants").' The
court held that Defendants could be contributorially liable for
assisting TheBagAddiction.com in its online counterfeiting
operation and unauthorized use of the Gucci trademarks.2 This
decision increases the cost of doing business for acquiring banks
and "replica" merchants, and therefore, will indirectly reduce the
supply of online counterfeit goods.
1. Gucci America, Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228,
237 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Gucci also brought suit against other "ABC companies"
and "John Does" who participated with the named defendants in the
infringement of Gucci products. Id. at 238 n.9.
2. Id. at 236.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
This case is part of Gucci's battle to curb online sales of
counterfeit products and the unauthorized use of Gucci's
trademarks. This case marks the second phase of Gucci's attack
on a website called TheBagAddiction.com. 4 In the first phase,
Gucci brought suit against Laurette Company, Inc. ("Laurette")
and other defendants for operation of the website which sold
handbags featuring counterfeit Gucci marks.? Laurette eventually
consented to judgment and admitted "that, without authorization of
license . .. they willfully and intentionally used, reproduced and/or
copied the Gucci [m]arks in connection with their manufacturing,
distributing, exporting, importing, advertising, marketing, selling,
and/or offering to sell their [c]ounterfeit [p]roducts."'
Subsequently, Gucci initiated this case against Durango,
Frontline, and Woodforest for assisting Laurette's counterfeiting
operation.' In the fall of 2006, Laurette approached Durango' for
help finding a company that would process online credit card
3. Id. at 236-37. Gucci is a well-known designer and manufacturer of luxury
shoes, handbags, and other leather goods. Id. at 236. The company has
registered several marks with the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
including the Gucci name, the Gucci crest, the "non-interlocking GG
monogram," and the "repeating GG design." Id.
4. Id. at 237.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 237.
8. Durango, a Wyoming corporation, helped business owners set up
merchant accounts with institutions that provide credit card processing services.
Id. On its website, Durango advertised its specialty in procuring credit card
services for "high risk merchant accounts," including those that sell "replica
products." Id. at 238. Durango also "collected a referral fee for bringing
together these online merchants with banks and companies like Frontline and
Woodforest." Id. Gucci alleged that Durango acted as an agent for Frontline
and Woodforest, whose objective was to recruit online counterfeiters. Id. at
238-39.
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payments for TheBagAddiction.com.9  Durango arranged for
Frontline'o and Woodforest" to provide Laurette with credit card
processing services.12  Frontline and Woodforest both provided
Laurette with the ability to process credit card payments for online
sales from November 2006 until June 2008, when
TheBagAddiction.com was shut down."
B. Procedural History
Gucci alleged that Durango, Frontline, and Woodforest were
liable for: (1) direct trademark infringement and counterfeiting; (2)
contributory trademark infringement and counterfeiting; (3)
vicarious trademark infringement; and (4) trademark infringement
and unfair competition.14 Defendants jointly moved to dismiss all
claims based on lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a
claim."
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Personal Jurisdiction
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that Gucci presented a prima facie case of personal
jurisdiction over Defendants and denied Defendants' motion to
9. See Complaint at 50, Gucci America, Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp.,
721 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 6925).
10. Frontline, a Nevada Corporation, is "a nationwide provider of credit card
processing and electronic services for merchants, banks, and sales agents."
Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 237-38. Frontline is also an "Independent Service
Organization" for Visa and "Merchant Service Provider" for Mastercard. Id. at
238.
11. Woodforest is a United States bank which "provides certain credit card
processing services." Id. at 238.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 239-40.
14. Id. at 240.
15. Id.
2011] 403
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dismiss.16
The court found that Defendants were amenable to service of
process under New York state law section 302(a)(3)(ii) for a
tortious act committed outside the state that causes injury within
the state." The court also found that asserting personal jurisdiction
over the Defendants did not violate constitutional due process."
B. Failure to State a Claim
1. Direct and Vicarious Infringement Claims
The court quickly dismissed the claims for direct and vicarious
trademark infringement as to all defendants.19 With regard to
direct infringement, the court found Gucci pled no facts which
could establish that Defendants actually "used the mark in
commerce," as is legally required under the theory for direct
liability.20 The court reiterated that knowledge alone does not
support a finding of direct trademark infringement.2'
The court also found that vicarious trademark infringement did
16. Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 253.
17. Id. at 241. In order to have jurisdiction under section 302(a)(3)(ii) a
plaintiff must demonstrate that "(1) the defendant committed a tortious act
outside the state; (2) the cause of action arose from that act; (3) the act caused
injury to a person or property within the state; (4) the defendant expected or
should reasonably have expected the act to have consequences in the state; and
(5) the defendant derives substantial revenue from interstate or international
commerce." Id. at 241 (citing Sole Resort, S.A. de C.V. v. Allure Resorts
Mgmt., LLC, 450 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2006)). See also, N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW §
302(a)(3)(ii) (Consol. 2010).
18. See generally, Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 244-46.
19. Id. at 246.
20. Id. at 246-47. In order to establish direct trademark infringement, a
plaintiff must prove (1) rights to a valid mark that is protected under the
Lanham Act; (2) that defendant used the mark in commerce in connection with
the sale and or advertising of goods or services, without plaintiffs consent; and
(3) that Defendant's use of the mark is likely to cause confusion. Id. at 246-47
(citing 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 406-07 (2d Cir.
2005)).
21. Id. at 247.
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not apply because Defendants did not have the type of control over
Laurette necessary to support the claim.2 2 The court explained that
while the alleged facts supported a notion that Defendants'
services were necessary to Laurette's counterfeiting operations,
they did not establish that Defendants and Laurette were involved
in an actual or apparent partnership. 23
2. Contributory Infringement Claims
The court found Gucci's claims for contributory infringement
the most credible. 24 Adopting a modified version of the Inwood
test,25 the court held that Gucci could establish contributory
liability by showing that Defendants "(1) intentionally induced the
website to infringe through the sale of counterfeit goods; or (2)
knowingly supplied services to the website and had sufficient
control over infringing activity to merit liability."26
a. First Prong: Intentional Inducement
The court found that the facts alleged by Gucci were sufficient
to establish that Durango, but not Frontline or Woodforest, had
intentionally encouraged Laurette's counterfeiting activities and
22. Id. Vicarious trademark infringement "requires a finding that the
defendant and the infringer have an apparent or actual partnership, have
authority to bind one another in transactions with third parties, or exercise joint
ownership or control over the infringing product." Id. (citing Hard Rock Cafe
Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir.
1992); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir.
2007)). The court acknowledged that the Second Circuit has not considered this
form of liability. Id.
23. Id.
24. Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 247.
25. In Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., the Supreme Court held that "if a
manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a
trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or
distributor is contributorially responsible." 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). The
second prong of this test was modified, to allow for its application to service
providers. Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 248.
26. Id. at 248.
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trademark infringement." The court found several facts significant
in its analysis. First, the court found representations on Durango's
website to be evidence of its "attempt to induce less savory
businesses."28 This included representations by Durango that it
specialized in acquiring credit card processing services for "high
risk merchant[s]," including those who sell "replica" products.29
Second, Laurette specifically informed a Durango sales
representative, Nathan Counley, that it had difficulty obtaining
credit card processing services because it was a "replica"
merchant.3 0 Finally, and most importantly, Durango helped
Laurette design a system to avoid chargebacks." The system, set
up by Laurette with the assistance of Durango, required customers
to check a box which stated "I understand these are replicas."32
The court found this to suggest that Durango affirmatively took
steps to foster infringement.3 3
With regard to Frontline and Woodforest, the court found that
neither intentionally induced Laurette's counterfeiting activities.3 4
The court explained that while both Frontline and Woodforest
advertised and provided services to high risk merchants, they did
not acquire the Laurette account as a result of those
advertisements. Instead, Durango induced Laurette and arranged
for Frontline and Woodforest to provide Laurette with credit card
processing services.36
27. Id. at 248-49.
28. Id. at 248.
29. Id.
30. Id. Both parties disputed the meaning of "replica." Id. at 248 n.7. Gucci
alleged that that the term "replica merchant" was interchangeable with
"counterfeiter." Id. Defendants argued that the term was not as loaded as Gucci
made it out to be. Id. The court noted that "replica" is "often used in
conjunction, or interchangeably with the term counterfeit" and that because it
was ruling on a motion to dismiss it would rely on the pleadings. Id.
31. Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 249. A chargeback occurs when a customer
disputes a credit card charge. Id. at 239.
32. Id. at 249.
3 3. Id.
34. Id.
3 5. Id.
3 6. Id.
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b. Second Prong: Knowledge and Control
The court found that the facts supported a cause of action
against Frontline and Woodforest for contributory infringement
based on the second prong of the Inwood test: knowledge and
control of the instrumentality used to infringe."
i. Knowledge ofInfringing Activities
To satisfy the knowledge requirement, a party must show that
the contributory infringer had actual knowledge or, in the
alternative, demonstrated a willful blindness to a third-party's
counterfeiting activities." However, this knowledge must be
specific.3 9 A party's generalized knowledge that its service is
being used to infringe is insufficient.40 The court found a strong
inference that each defendant knew Laurette manufactured and
sold counterfeit products, or were willfully blind to the fact.41
The court found that Durango could be imputed with knowledge
based on communications between Laurette and a Durango sales
representative, Nathan Counley, that Laurette was unable to obtain
credit card processing services because it sold "replica" products.4 2
The court held that, "[s]urely, a connection between an inability to
get the services needed to transact goods online and the sale of
replicas should have attracted Durango's attention."
The court listed several reasons for finding that Frontline knew,
or should have known, of Laurette's activities." First, the court
noted that Counley, Durango's employee, was listed as Frontline's
37. Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 253.
38. Id. at 249 (citing Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir.
2010); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir.
2007)).
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107) ("[C]ontemporary knowledge of
which particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the future is
necessary.")
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 249.
44. Id. at 249-50.
2011] 407
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sales agent on Laurette's Frontline application. 45 Thus, Durango's
knowledge of Laurette's inability to obtain processing services
could be attributed to Frontline.4 6 Additionally, Frontline reviewed
the "replica acknowledgement" that Durango created for Laurette
and made suggestions about its placement on the website.4 7
Ultimately, the court found Frontline's involvement in the
chargeback process to be the most significant evidence of
Frontline's knowledge. 48  As part of the chargeback process,
Laurette would submit information to Frontline about disputed
items, including a description of the specific products. 49 Frontline
reviewed this information, along with the customers' complaints.so
The court accepted Gucci's argument that Frontline should have
been aware that Laurette was selling counterfeit goods based on
the relatively low price of the items in conjunction with the
specifics of the customer complaints.51
Along similar lines, the court found that Gucci pled sufficient
facts to infer that Woodforest knew or consciously avoided
knowing of Laurette's counterfeiting activities.52 The court
explained that the circumstances surrounding Laurette's
application process with Woodforest highlighted this knowledge."
Like Frontline, Counley listed himself as Woodforest's sales agent
on Laurette's Woodforest application.54 Accordingly, the court
presumed that Woodforest knew that Laurette had difficulty
obtaining processing services because it sold "replicas."" Also, on
the Woodforest application, Laurette designated itself as "a
45. Id.
46. Id. at 250.
47. Id. The "replica acknowledgement" required customers to check a box
stating "I understand these are replicas." Id. at 249.
48. Id. at 250.
49. Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 250.
50. Id.
51. Id. Gucci alleged that some of these chargebacks were the result of the
customer not receiving the type of item that TheBagAddiction.com purported to
sell, for example "a product made of genuine leather." Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing Complaint at 72, Gucci America, Inc. v. Frontline Processing
Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 6925).
55. Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 250.
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wholesale/retail designer of handbags" 6 and listed its supplier "as
a Chinese bag manufacturer."" With this information, Woodforest
reviewed TheBagAddiction.com to verify that the site contained a
complete description of the products offered." The court found
that "even a cursory view" of the website would have shown that
Laurette sold "replica" Gucci bags.59 Thus, Woodforest's
knowledge of Laurette's infringing conduct was established before
it even decided to do business with Laurette.60 The court also
found several other facts supporting an inference of Woodforest's
knowledge.6 1 For example, Woodforest performed regular reviews
of the website, where it would purchase a product and request a
refund.62 Moreover, like Frontline, Woodforest handled
chargebacks for Laurette.6 ' The court found that based on the
information received as a part of the chargeback process
Woodforest knew or should have known that Laurette was
engaged in counterfeiting activities.'
ii. Sufficient Control Over the Instrumentality Used to
Infringe
The court explained that in order to satisfy the control element
of the second prong of the modified Inwood test, Gucci must show
Defendants' direct control and monitoring of the instrumentality
used to infringe." Ultimately, the court found that Gucci alleged
56. Id. (citing Complaint Exhibit 6, Gucci America, Inc. v. Frontline
Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 6925).
57. Id.
58. Id. Woodforest typically reviewed websites of online merchants and the
products on the site as part of its application process. Id. Woodforest even had
an "Internet Merchant Review Checklist" to assist employees in this task. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 250.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. This information included prices of the items purchased, product
descriptions, and specific customer complaints. Id.
65. Id. at 248 (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d
788, 807 (9th Cir. 2007); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.,
194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999)).
2011] 409
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sufficient facts to find that Frontline and Woodforest, but not
Durango, had sufficient control over Laurette's counterfeiting
activities.66
The court found there was little evidence that Durango had any
control over Laurette's infringing activity.67 Once Durango
arranged for services to be provided by Frontline and Woodforest,
it had no ability to stop them from processing credit card
payments." In the court's words, Durango was essentially a
"middle man."69
However, the court found that Frontline and Woodforest had
sufficient control to warrant liability because they provided
services necessary for infringement and without those services
Laurette could not have carried out its infringing activities." The
court emphasized the importance of credit card processing services
to online merchants, explaining that credit cards serve as the
primary form of online payment." The court also noted
Frontline's and Woodforest's economic interest in
TheBagAddiction.com.7 2
Importantly, the court rejected Defendants' argument that they
lacked sufficient control because they did not have the power to
actually shut down TheBagAddiction.com." The court explained
that the ability to shut the website down was not required; rather,
Gucci had to show sufficient control over the instrumentality used
to infringe.74 The court held that the instrumentality used to
infringe was not just the website, but "the combination of the
66. Id. at 251.
67. Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 251.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. The court noted that Durango's website claimed that "9 out of 10
customers use a credit card payment for their online orders." Id. Further, one
website owner stated that "approximately 99% of payments from my customers
were made using credit cards." Id.
72. Id. Gucci alleged that during the time that Laurette used Frontline's and
Woodforest's services, Laurette sold over $500,000 in counterfeit products. Id.
The court explained that both companies earned transaction fees on every sale.
Id at 251-52.
73. Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 252.
74. Id.
410
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website and the credit card network."7 5
According to the court, Defendants mistakenly relied on Perfect
10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Serv. Ass'n.76  The court distinguished
Perfect 10, explaining that in Perfect 10, the infringing activity,
publishing and distributing the plaintiffs trademarked images over
the internet, could have occurred without the defendants' credit
card processing services;77 the defendants' services simply made
infringement profitable." Thus, in Perfect 10, the instrumentality
used to infringe was the website itself.79 The court explained that
payment was a prerequisite to Laurette's shipment of tangible
infringing items, and therefore, part of the instrumentality used to
infringe."
The court went on to explain that the instant case was more
similar to Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Aris Getty, Inc., where the
defendant was found contributorially liable for delivering
unbranded gasoline to stations it knew would resell the gasoline
under the plaintiffs brand name." Like the defendant in Getty,
Frontline and Woodforest were "essential factor[s]"82 to the
infringement because they "furnished the means of
consummating" the sale of the counterfeit goods." The court
75. Id.
76. Id. In Perfect 10, the plaintiff, a publisher of a pornographic magazine
and host of an adult entertainment website, sued the defendants, a group of
credit card companies, for contributory trademark infringement. Perfect 10, Inc.
v. Visa Intern. Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 792-93 (9th Cir. 2007). Ultimately,
the Ninth Circuit held that the defendants could not be liable for providing credit
card processing services to another adult entertainment website that had taken
and published Perfect 10's trademarked images. Id. at 807.
77. Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 252.
78. See Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 797-98.
79. Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 252.
80. Id. at 252-53. One website operator testified, "if I did not receive an
approval for a credit card charge, I would not ship the customer's order." Id. at
252.
81. Id. at 253 (citing Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Aris Getty, Inc., 55 F.3d 718,
719 (1st Cir. 1995)).
82. Id. at 253.
83. Id. (citing Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010)
(quoting William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 530
(1924))).
2011] 411
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found that the facts taken as a whole, demonstrated that
Defendants did not just create an "economic incentive to infringe,"
but rather were "an essential step in the . . . process."8 4
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Judge Baer's holding, extending contributory trademark
infringement to acquiring banks that knowingly provide credit card
processing services to "replica" merchants while maintaining
sufficient control over those operations, will have a significant
effect on the counterfeiting industry. Certainly, acquiring banks
will be more cautious about with whom they choose to do
business." However, most acquiring banks already refuse to
service businesses that offer products or services that are illegal, or
borderline illegal." Thus, only those acquiring banks that choose
to do business with "less than savory" clientele, like Frontline and
Woodforest, will be affected. These acquiring banks will be
forced to decide whether to deny services to "replica" merchants
or provide the services and risk litigation.
Importantly, this holding has been construed as inconsistent
precedent." The court factually distinguished this case from the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Perfect 10, particularly with regard to
the instrumentality used to infringe." However, the distinction is
quite vague. In Perfect 10, the Ninth Circuit found that the
defendants' credit card payment systems were not part of the
84. Id. at 252 (quoting Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 811-12 (Kozinski, J.
dissenting)).
85. See Thomas Carey, Who's Holding the Bag? When a Website Sells
Infringing Articles, Credit Card Companies May Face Liability, SUSTEIN, July
2010, http://www.sunsteinlaw.com/publications-news/news-letters/2010/07/
Carey_201007.html.
86. See MerchantCouncil.org, High Risk Merchant Accounts,
http://www.merchantcouncil.org/merchant-account/types-uses/high-risk-
merchant- account.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2011); see also Perfect 10, 494 F.3d
at 802.
87. See Carey, supra note 85 (explaining that "[c]ourts. . . now have
inconsistent precedent to consider").
88. Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 252-53.
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instrumentality used to infringe." Here, the court found the
instrumentality used to infringe was a combination of the credit
card payment systems and the website because Gucci alleged
infringement by sale and distribution of counterfeit goods." As
Judge Kozinski noted in the Perfect 10 dissent, Perfect 10 alleged
infringement by distribution, which also occurred by sale.9 1 Thus,
the Southern District of New York affords a broader interpretation
to the instrumentality used to infringe.
These legal uncertainties provide wiggle room for acquiring
banks, who will continue to provide services to "replica"
merchants until the opportunity for profits is outweighed by the
risks. For many acquiring banks, especially those meeting the
requirements for personal jurisdiction in the Southern District of
New York, the risk of potential lawsuits may be too great, causing
them to immediately exit the market. Those that remain will
compensate the risks by increasing the already high credit card
processing fees charged to "replica" merchants. Furthermore,
these acquiring banks will have to charge extremely high
compensation rates because the risk of litigation is not easily
mitigated. For instance, processors are required to handle
chargebacks as part of their member agreement with Visa.92 This
means an acquiring bank is obligated by Visa to ensure that its
customers receive the product or service they were charged for,
and necessarily involves looking at the disputed item, its price, and
the customer's complaints. Thus, an acquiring bank will have
difficulty arguing that they were unaware a particular website was
selling "replicas." Further, acquiring banks are required to
perform a variety of checks before granting services to a
merchant.9 3 This process also presents acquiring banks with
89. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 807.
90. Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 252-53.
91. Perfect 10, 494 F. 3d at 814.
92. VISA INTERNATIONAL OPERATING REGULATIONS at 89 (2010),
http://corporate.visa.com/ media/visa-international-operating-regulations.pdf.
A "[m]ember must, at a minimum, guarantee that: . . . [p]ayments received
from Cardholders are applied for the purpose for which they were remitted. ...
These obligations must not be waived, abrogated, or superseded in any manner."
Id.
93. Id. For example, a merchant is required to conduct an "inspection" for
2011] 413
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knowledge about applying merchants' activities that would be hard
to deny in court.
These extremely high processing rates will ultimately be passed
onto the "replica" merchants' consumers in the form of higher
prices. At a certain point, consumers' preferences will change and
they will choose not to purchase "replicas." Some consumers will
opt for the real brand; others will choose comparable alternatives:
for example, buying a Coach instead of a fake Gucci handbag.
This decrease in demand will necessarily be followed by a
decrease in supply. As "replica" merchants find their operations
are no longer profitable, they will exit the market.
V. CONCLUSION
The District Court for the Southern District of New York found
that credit card service providers could be contributorially liable
for trademark infringement as a result of processing payments for
online merchants who sell counterfeit goods. This holding will
have an indirect effect of pushing some "replica" merchants out of
the industry and is a progressive step towards stopping
infringement. Whether this fulfills the ultimate goal of secondary
liability, stopping infringement at the least cost to society, is
another question.94
Rebecca R. Younger
prospective merchants. Id. This entails "a physical inspection of the business
premises." Id. Further, "[flor Mail/Phone Order and Electronic Commerce
Merchants, the Acquirer must also obtain a detailed business description." Id.
(emphasis added).
94. WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 118-19 (2003).
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